Abstract. We consider the cheating strategies for the popular matchings problem. Let G = (A ∪ P, E) be a bipartite graph where A denotes a set of agents, P denotes a set of posts and the edges in E are ranked. Each agent ranks a subset of posts in an order of preference, possibly involving ties. A matching M is popular if there exists no matching M ′ such that the number of agents that prefer M ′ to M exceeds the number of agents that prefer M to M ′ . Consider a centralized market where agents submit their preferences and a central authority matches agents to posts according to the notion of popularity. Since a popular matching need not be unique, we assume that the central authority chooses an arbitrary popular matching. Let a1 be the sole manipulative agent who is aware of the true preference lists of all other agents. The goal of a1 is to falsify her preference list to get better always, that is, in the falsified instance (i) every popular matching matches a1 to a post that is at least as good as the most-preferred post that she gets when she was truthful, and (ii) some popular matching matches a1 to a post better than the most-preferred post p that she gets when she was truthful, assuming that p is not one of a1's (true) most-preferred posts. We show that the optimal cheating strategy for a single agent to get better always can be computed in O(m+n) time when preference lists are all strict and in O( √ nm) time when preference lists are allowed to contain ties. Here n = |A| + |P| and m = |E|. Next, we consider the set of agents, their preference lists and the popular matchings algorithm as a non-cooperative game. We show a necessary and sufficient condition for the true preference lists of the agents to be an equilibrium of this game when each agent wishes to get better always. To compute the cheating strategies, we develop a switching graph characterization of the popular matchings problem involving ties. The switching graph characterization was studied for the case of strict lists by McDermid and Irving (J. Comb. Optim. 2011) and was open for the case of ties. We show an O( √ nm) algorithm to compute the set of popular pairs using the switching graph. These results are of independent interest and answer a part of the open questions posed by McDermid and Irving.
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Definition 1.
A matching M is more popular than M ′ if the number of agents that prefer M is greater than the number of agents that prefer M ′ . A matching M is popular if there is no matching M ′ that is more popular than M .
There exist simple instances that do not admit any popular matching -however, when an instance admits a popular matching, there may be more than one popular matching. Abraham et al. [1] characterized the instances that admit popular matchings and gave efficient algorithms to compute a popular matching if one exists. Our problem. Consider a centralized matching market where each agent a ∈ A submits a preference over a subset of posts and a central authority matches agents to posts using the criteria of popularity. Let a 1 be the sole manipulative agent who is aware of the true preference lists of all other agents and the preference lists of a ∈ A \ {a 1 } remain fixed throughout. The goal of a 1 is clear: she wishes to falsify her preference list so as to improve the post that she gets matched to as compared to the post she got when she was truthful. Since there may be more than one popular matching in an instance, we assume that the central authority chooses an arbitrary popular matching. Let G = (A ∪ P, E) denote the instance where ranks on the edges represent true preferences of all the agents. Let H denote the instance obtained by falsifying the preference list of a 1 alone. We assume that G admits a popular matching and a 1 falsifies in order to create an instance H which also admits a popular matching. Note that it may be possible for a 1 to falsify her preference list such that H does not admit any popular matching. But we do not consider such a falsification.
Agent a 1 wishes to falsify her preference list to ensure that (i) every popular matching in H matches her to a post that is at least as good as the mostpreferred post that she gets matched to in G, and (ii) some popular matching in H matches a 1 to a post better than the most-preferred post p that she gets matched to in G, assuming that p is not a 1 's true first choice post. We term this strategy of a 1 as 'better always' strategy.
Our contributions
-Let a 1 be the sole manipulative agent who wishes to get better always. The optimal strategy for a 1 can be computed in O(m + n) time when preference lists are all strict and in O( √ nm) time when preference lists are allowed to contain ties. -Next, consider the set of agents, their preference lists and the popular matchings algorithm as a non-cooperative game. We show a necessary and sufficient condition for the true preference lists to be an equilibrium of the game assuming that every agent wishes to get better always. -To compute the cheating strategies, we develop a switching graph characterization of the popular matchings problem involving ties. The switching graph characterization was studied for the case of strict lists by McDermid and Irving [13] and such a characterization was not known for the case of ties. Using the switching graph, we show an O( √ nm) time algorithm to compute the set of popular pairs. An edge (a, p) ∈ E is a popular pair if there exists a popular matching M in G such that (a, p) ∈ M . We also show that counting the total number of popular matchings in an instance with ties is #P-Complete. The switching graph characterization is of independent interest and answers a part of the open questions in [13] .
Related work
The work in this paper is motivated by the work of Teo et al. [16] where they study the strategic issues of the stable marriage problem [3] . The stable marriage problem is a generalization of our problem where both the sides of the bipartition (usually referred to as men and women) rank members of the opposite side in order of their preference. Teo et al. [16] study the strategic issues of the stable marriage problem where women are required to give complete preference lists and there is a sole manipulative woman. Further, she is aware of the true preference lists of all the other women. Teo et al. [16] compute an optimal cheating strategy for a single woman under this model. Huang [5] studies the strategic issues of the stable room-mates problem [3] under a similar model. In the same spirit, we study the strategic issues of the popular matchings problem. The notion of popular matchings was introduced by Gärdenfors [4] in the context of the stable marriage [3] . Abraham et al. [1] studied the problem for one-sided preference lists and gave a characterization of instances which admit a popular matching. Subsequent to this result, the popular matchings problem has received a lot of attention [11] [12] [9] [6] [8] . However, to the best of our knowledge none of them is motivated by the strategic issues of the popular matchings problem.
Background
We first review the following well known properties of maximum matchings in bipartite graphs. Let G = (A ∪ P, E) be a bipartite graph and let M be a maximum matching in G. The matching M defines a partition of the vertex set A ∪ P into three disjoint sets: a vertex v ∈ A ∪ P is even (resp. odd ) if there is an even (resp. odd) length alternating path in G w.r.t. M from an unmatched vertex to v. A vertex v is unreachable if there is no alternating path from an unmatched vertex to v. Denote by E, O and U the sets of even, odd, and unreachable vertices, respectively, in G. The following lemma is well known in matching theory; its proof can be found in [15] or [7] .
Lemma 1 ([15] Dulmage Mendelsohn)
. Let E, O and U be the sets of vertices defined by a maximum matching M in G. Then, (a) E, O and U are pairwise disjoint, and independent of the maximum matching M in G. (b) In any maximum matching of G, every vertex in O is matched with a vertex in E, and every vertex in U is matched with another vertex in U. The size of a maximum matching is |O| + |U|/2. (c) No maximum matching of G contains an edge between a vertex in O and a vertex in O ∪ U. Also, G contains no edge between a vertex in E and a vertex in E ∪ U.
We now review the characterization of the popular matchings problem from [1] . As was done in [1] , we create a unique last-resort post ℓ(a) for each agent a. In this way, we can assume that every agent is matched, since any unmatched agent a can be paired with ℓ(a). For an agent a, let f (a) be the set of rank-1 posts for a. To define s(a), let us consider the graph G 1 = (A ∪ P, E 1 ) on rank-1 edges in G and let M 1 be any maximum matching in G 1 . Let O 1 , E 1 , U 1 define the partition of vertices A ∪ P with respect to M 1 in G 1 . For any agent a, let s(a) denote the set of most preferred posts which belong to E 1 by the above partition. Abraham et al. [1] proved the following theorem.
Theorem 1 ([1]).
A matching M is popular in G iff (1) M ∩ E 1 is a maximum matching of G 1 = (A ∪ P, E 1 ), and (2) for each agent a, M (a) ∈ {f (a) ∪ s(a)}.
The algorithm for solving the popular matching problem is as follows: each a ∈ A determines the sets f (a) and s(a). An A-complete matching (a matching that matches all agents) that is maximum in G 1 and that matches each a to a post in {f (a)∪s(a)} needs to be determined. If no such matching exists, then G does not admit a popular matching. Abraham et al. [1] gave an O( √ nm) time algorithm to compute a popular matching in G which is presented as Algorithm 2.1. Steps 7-11 are added by us and will be used to define the switching graph in the next section. Abraham et al. [1] also showed a simpler characterization for the popular matchings in case of strict lists which results in an O(m + n) time algorithm to return a popular matching if one exists. Let G ′ = (A ∪ P, E ′ ) denote the graph in which every agent a has edges incident to {f (a) ∪ s(a)}.
Step 4 of Algorithm 2.1 deletes edges from G ′ which cannot be present in any maximum matching of G 1 . We extend this further and in Step 9 delete edges from G ′ which cannot be present in any popular matching in G. For this, let us partition the vertex set A ∪ P as O 2 , E 2 and U 2 with respect to a popular matching M in G ′ . Since any popular matching M is a maximum matching in G ′ , it is easy to see that M cannot contain edges of the form O 2 O 2 and O 2 U 2 (by Lemma 1(c)). However, note that since M matches every agent, it implies that A ∩ E 2 = ∅ and P ∩ O 2 = ∅. Thus, there are no O 2 O 2 edges in the graph G ′ . Therefore, any edge (a, p) deleted in Step 9 is of the form a ∈ O 2 and p ∈ U 2 . We can now make the following claim.
Claim. Let a be an agent such that a ∈ U 2 . Then, in Step 9 of Algorithm 2.1, no edge incident on a gets deleted. Let a be an agent such that a ∈ E 1 . Then, in
Step 4 of Algorithm 2.1, no edge incident on a gets deleted.
Algorithm 2.1 O(
√ nm)-time algorithm for the popular matching problem [1] (Steps 1-6).
Construct the graph G1 = (A ∪ P, E1) and let M1 be any maximum matching in G1. 3: Partition A ∪ P as O1, E1, U1 with respect to M1 in G1.
4: Remove any edge in G
′ between a node in O1 and a node in O1 ∪ U1. 5: Determine a maximum matching M in G ′ by augmenting M1. 6: Return M if it is A-complete, otherwise return "no popular matching". 7: if G admits a popular matching then 8:
Partition A ∪ P as O2, E2, U2 with respect to M in G ′ .
9:
Remove any edge in G ′ between a node in O2 and a node in U2.
10:
Denote the resulting graph as G ′′ = (A ∪ P, E ′′ ). 11: end if Definition 2. For an agent a, let choices(a) be the set of posts p such that (a, p) is an edge in G ′′ .
It is easy to see that for any a ∈ A, choices(a) ⊆ {f (a) ∪ s(a)}. Further, if M is a popular matching in G, then M (a) ∈ choices(a).
The switching graph characterization
In this section we develop the switching graph for the popular matchings problem with ties. In case of strict lists, McDermid and Irving [13] defined a switching graph G M = (P, E M ) as a directed graph on the posts of G and the edge set E M was determined by a popular matching M in G. In fact, a similar graph was defined even before that by Mahdian [11] (again for strict lists) to study existence of popular matchings in random instances. We use the notation and terminology from [13] .
Let G be an instance of the popular matchings problem with ties and let M be a popular matching in G. The switching graph G M = (P, E M ) is a directed weighted graph on the posts P of G and is defined with respect to a popular matching M in G. The edge set E M is defined using the pruned graph G ′′ = (A ∪ P, E ′′ ) constructed in Step 10 of Algorithm 2.1. There exists an edge from p i to p j (with p i = p j ) iff for some a ∈ A, p i = M (a) and (a, p j ) ∈ E ′′ . The weight of an edge w(M (a), p j ) is defined as:
It is easy to see that the graph
time using Algorithm 2.1.
The following lemma characterizes sinks in G M .
Lemma 2.
A post p is a sink vertex in G M if and only if p is unmatched in M .
Let X be a maximal weakly connected component of G M . Call X a sink component if X contains one or more sink vertices otherwise call X a non-sink component.
For a path T (resp. cycle C) in G M , the weight of the path w(T ) (resp. w(C)) is the sum of the weights on the edges in T (resp. C). (Whenever we refer to paths and cycles in G M we imply directed paths and directed cycles respectively.) A path 
Example 1.
Consider an instance G where A = {a 1 , . . . , a 7 } and P = {p 1 , . . . , p 9 }. The preference lists of the agents are shown in Figure 1 (a). The preference lists can be read as follows: agent a 1 ranks posts p 1 , p 2 , p 3 as her rank-1, rank-2 and rank-3 posts respectively and the two posts p 6 and p 7 are tied as her rank-4 posts. For every agent a, the posts which are bold denote the set f (a), whereas the posts which are underlined denote the set s(a). The instance G admits a popular matching; M and M ′ shown below are both popular in G.
Figure 1(b) shows the switching graph G M with respect to the popular matching M . We note that the edges (a 4 , p 3 ) and (a 1 , p 1 ) get deleted in Step 4 and Step 9
of Algorithm 2.1, respectively. Hence the switching graph G M does not have the edges (M (a 4 ) = p 2 , p 3 ) and (M (a 1 ) = p 6 , p 1 ) respectively. Consider the switching path T = p 9 , p 3 , p 4 , p 5 in G M . By applying T to M we get M ′ = M ·T (see Equation (2)) which is also popular in G. 
Some useful properties
In this section we prove some useful properties of the switching graph G M .
Recall that the vertices A ∪ P are partitioned as O Proof. Assume for the sake of contradiction that p is a sink vertex in G M and p ∈ O 1 ∪ U 1 . Recall that the sink vertices of G M are unmatched posts in the popular matching M in G. Since M is a popular matching, it implies that M is a maximum matching on rank-1 edges in G. However, every maximum matching on rank-1 edges of G matches every vertex in O 1 ∪ U 1 . Thus, if p is unmatched in M and p ∈ O 1 ∪ U 1 , it implies that M is not a maximum matching on rank-1 edges of G, a contradiction. Property 2. Every post p belonging to a sink component has a path to a sink and hence belongs to the set E 2 . Every post belonging to a non-sink component belongs to the set U 2 .
Proof. We prove that a post p belongs to a sink component of G M iff p ∈ E 2 . Let p be a post such that p ∈ E 2 . Then p is either unmatched in M or p has an even length alternating path starting at an unmatched vertex p ′ with respect to M in G ′ . If p is unmatched, then p is a sink vertex in G M and hence we are done. Else let p = p 1 , a 1 , . . . , p k , a k , p k+1 = p ′ denote the alternating path and for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k, we have M (p i ) = a i . Note that every unmatched edge (a i , p i+1 ) is of the form O 2 E 2 and hence none of these unmatched edges get deleted in Step 9 of Algorithm 2.1. Therefore, it is easy to see that the path p = p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p k+1 = p ′ is present in G M and hence p belongs to the sink component that contains p ′ . To prove the other direction let X be a sink component in G M and let p be some vertex in X . If p ∈ E 2 , it is easy to see that p has a path to some sink vertex in X and we are done, else p ∈ U 2 . Recall that O 2 ∩ P = ∅. Since p belongs to X , there exists some vertex p ′ in X such that p ′ ∈ E 2 and p ′ has a path to p in
. . , p k = p denote a path of minimal length. Note that for each
By the minimality of the path, we know that for 2
Thus the presence of edge (p 1 , p 2 ) in G M implies that there is a O 2 U 2 edge in the graph G ′′ which should have been deleted by step 9 of Algorithm 2.1. Hence such an edge cannot be present in G M contradicting the fact that p ∈ U 2 . This implies that every vertex contained in a sink component of G M has a path to some sink in the component.
The above proof immediately implies that a post p belongs to a non-sink component iff p ∈ U 2 . This finishes the proof of Property 2.
is determined by which partition p i and p j belong to when vertices are partitioned as O 1 , E 1 , U 1 . w(p i , p j ) can be determined using Table 1 . Table 1 . Table shows w(pi, pj) for an edge (pi, pj) in GM . The weight is determined by the partition of vertices as O1, E1, U1. The × denotes that such an edge is not present in GM .
Proof. To prove Property 3 we justify the entries in Table 1 . Let (p i , p j ) be an edge in G M and let M (p i ) = a. The weight on the edge (p i , p j ) is determined by the relative ranks of p i and p j in a's preference list. We note that a post p ∈ O 1 ∪ U 1 has only rank-1 edges incident on it in the graph G ′ . Hence if p i ∈ O 1 ∪ U 1 , then a treats p i as her rank-1 post.
-p i ∈ O 1 : a treats p i as her rank-1 post and since posts in O 1 remain matched along agents in E 1 , it implies that a ∈ E 1 .
• p j ∈ O 1 : a treats p j as her rank-1 post, thus, w(p i , p j ) = 0.
• p j ∈ E 1 : We show that a treats p j as her non-rank-1 post and hence w(p i , p j ) = −1. Assume for the sake of contradiction that a treats p j as a rank-1 post. It implies that there is a E 1 E 1 edge in the graph G 1 , a contradiction (by part (c) Lemma 1).
• p j ∈ U 1 : We show that such an edge cannot exist in G M . Recall that posts in U 1 have only rank-1 edges incident on them, hence a treats p j as her rank-1 post. This implies that there is a E 1 U 1 edge in G 1 a contradiction (by part (c) of Lemma 1).
Here we consider two cases:
(i) a treats p i as her rank-1 post: In this case, we note that s(a) ⊆ f (a) and hence a has only rank-1 edges incident on it in the graph G ′ and all these edges are incident on posts which belong to E 1 . Thus the only case possible is, p j ∈ E 1 and w(p i , p j ) = 0.
(ii) a treats p i as her non-rank-1 post: We first note that a ∈ E 1 because agents in O 1 ∪U 1 remain matched along rank-1 edges in every popular matching. Consider the three different cases for p j .
• p j ∈ O 1 : a treats p j as her rank-1 post and hence w(p i , p j ) = +1.
• p j ∈ E 1 : We show that a treats p j as her non-rank-1 post and hence w(p i , p j ) = 0. Assume for the sake of contradiction that a treats p j as her rank-1 post. Then there exists an
We show that such an edge cannot exist in G M . If such an edge exists there is an E 1 U 1 edge in G 1 a contradiction (by part (c) of Lemma 1). -p i ∈ U 1 : a treats p i as her rank-1 post and since posts in U 1 remain matched along agents in U 1 , it implies that a ∈ U 1 .
• p j ∈ O 1 : a treats p j as her rank-1 post however such an edge gets deleted as an O 1 U 1 edge in Step 4 of Algorithm 2.1. Thus such an edge cannot be present in G M .
• p j ∈ E 1 : We show that a treats p j as her non-rank-1 edge and hence w(p i , p j ) = −1. Assume for the sake of contradiction that a treats p j as a rank-1 post then, it implies that there is a U 1 E 1 edge in the graph G 1 , a contradiction (by part (c) of Lemma 1).
• p j ∈ U 1 : a treats p j as her rank-1 post and therefore w(p i , p j ) = 0.
Property 4. Every path
Proof. It is easy to observe that if the edges have weights according to Table 1 , then every path in G M has weight belonging to {−1, 0, +1}. Further every cycle has to have weight 0. It remains to argue that in G M there exists no path T of weight +1 which ends in a sink. For contradiction, assume that such a path exists in G M and consider applying the path T to M to obtain the matching
The number of agents that prefer M ′ to M is exactly one more than the number of agents that prefer M to M ′ . Thus M ′ is more popular than M , contradicting the fact that M was a popular matching.
Property 5. For any switching path T (or switching cycle
) is a popular matching in G. Every popular matching M ′ in G can be obtained from M by applying to M one or more vertex disjoint switching paths and switching cycles in each of a subset of sink components of G M together with one or more vertex disjoint switching cycles in each of a subset of the non-sink components of G M .
Proof. Let T = p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p k be a switching path in G M with p k unmatched in M and M ′ = M · T denote the matching obtained by applying the path
Finally note that since w(T ) = 0, for every agent that got demoted from her rank-1 post there exists a unique agent who got promoted to her rank-1 post in M ′ . Thus, M ′ is a maximum matching on rank-1 edges of G. It is therefore clear that M ′ satisfies both the properties defined by Theorem 1 and hence M ′ is a popular matching in G. An exactly similar argument proves that for any switching cycle C, M · C is also a popular matching in G.
Let M ′ be any popular matching in G. Consider M ⊕ M ′ , this is set of vertex disjoint even length paths and even length cycles in G.
Note that every unmatched edge (a i , p i+1 ) is of the form O 2 E 2 and hence none of these unmatched edges get deleted in Step 9 of Algorithm 2.1. Therefore, it is easy to see that the path p = p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p k+1 = p ′ is present in G M and it ends in a sink. Note that w(T ) cannot be strictly positive since M is a popular matching. Similarly, w(T ) cannot be strictly negative. This is because since both M and M ′ are popular, w(T ) ≤ −1 implies that there exists another path
′ , whose corresponding path T ′ (resp. cycle C ′ ) in the graph G M has a positive weight. However, this again contradicts the fact that M is a popular matching. Thus, the path T has weight 0 and ends in a sink and hence is a switching path. A similar argument shows that every cycle in M ⊕ M ′ has a corresponding switching cycle in G M . Applying these switching paths and cycles to M gives us the desired matching M ′ , thus completing the proof.
Recall the definition of choices(a) for an agent as given by Definition 2. We now define the notion of a tight-pair , that is, a set of agents A 1 and a set of posts P 1 with |A 1 | = |P 1 |. Further, for every a ∈ A 1 we have choices(a) ⊆ P 1 . We show that a tight-pair exists whenever there is a non-sink component in the switching graph G M .
Lemma 3. Let Y be a non-sink component in G M and q ∈ Y. Let, P q = q ∪ {p : q has a path to p in G M } Then there exists a set of agents A q such that (i) |A q | = |P q |, and (ii) for every a ∈ A q , choices(a) ⊆ P q .
Proof. Let A q = ∪ p∈Pq M (p). Since every p ∈ P q is matched, we note that |A q | = |P q |. Consider any agent a ∈ A q ; then M (a) ∈ P q and note that M (a) ∈ choices(a). Further, note that, for every p ′ ∈ choices(a) \ {M (a)}, we have an edge (M (a), p ′ ) in G M . Thus, every such p ′ also belongs to P q . This proves that for every a ∈ A q , choices(a) ⊆ P q .
Generating popular pairs and counting popular matchings
Let G = (A ∪ P, E) be an instance of the popular matchings problem. Define
Using the switching graph defined in the previous section, it is easy to compute the set P opP airs in G. Let G M be the switching graph with respect to a popular matching M in G. From Property 5 we can conclude that an edge e = (a, p) is a popular pair if and only if (i) e ∈ M or, (ii) the edge (M (a), p) belongs to some switching path in G M or, (iii) the edge (M (a), p) belongs to some switching cycle in G M .
We note that edges satisfying condition (i) can be marked in O( √ nm) time using Algorithm 2.1 and edges satisfying conditions (ii) and (iii) can be marked in linear time in the size of the switching graph. Thus, we conclude the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The set of popular pairs for an instance G = (A ∪ P, E) of the popular matchings problem with ties can be computed in O( √ nm) time.
Proof. From Property 5 we can conclude that an edge e = (a, p) is a popular pair if and only if (i) e ∈ M or, (ii) the edge (M (a), p) belongs to some switching path in G M or, (iii) the edge (M (a), p) belongs to some switching cycle in G M . We show how each of these conditions can be efficiently verified.
-The condition (i) can be checked in O( √ nm) time by running Algorithm 2.1 and obtaining a popular matching M . -In order to check condition (iii), recall that every cycle in G M has weight 0 and is therefore a switching cycle. Hence this condition can be checked in linear time in the size of the switching graph by identifying strongly connected components of G M . Every edge belonging to a strongly connected component is a popular pair. -In order to check condition (ii), recall that a switching path is a path which has weight 0 and ends in a sink. Therefore such paths can be found only in sink components of G M or equivalently paths beginning at vertices in E 2 . Further, any sink vertex in G M has to be a vertex in E 1 according to the partition on rank-1 edges of G. Using the weights on the edges given by Table 1 , it is easy to see that any 0 weight path ending in a sink has to begin at a vertex p ∈ E 1 . Thus, a simple depth-first search beginning at vertices in E 1 ∩ E 2 and marking all edges that we encounter as popular pairs takes care of condition (ii). It is easy to see that this procedure also takes time linear in the size of G M .
We now show that given an instance of the popular matchings problem with ties, the problem of counting the number of popular matchings is #P-Complete.
Theorem 3. Given an instance G = (A ∪ P, E) of the popular matchings problem with ties, counting the total number of popular matchings in G is #P-Complete.
Proof. In order to prove the completeness result, we reduce from the problem of counting the number of perfect matchings in 3-regular bipartite graphs. This problem was shown to be #P-Complete by Dagum and Luby [2] . Let H = (A ∪ P, E) be a 3-regular bipartite graph. We construct an instance G = H of the popular matching problem by assigning all the edges in E as rank-1 edges. It is well-known that a k-regular bipartite graph admits a perfect matching and hence it is easy to see that every perfect matching in H is a popular matching in G and vice versa. Thus, the theorem statement follows.
Cheating strategies -preliminaries
In this section we set up the notation useful in formulating our cheating strategies. We begin by partitioning the set of agents A depending on the posts that a particular agent gets matched to when each agent is truthful, that is, in the instance G.
A f = {a : every popular matching in G matches a to one of her rank-1 posts} A s = {a : every popular matching in G matches a to one of her non-rank-1 posts}
The set A f /s denotes the set of agents a such that a gets matched to one of her rank-1 posts in some popular matching in G, whereas to one of her nonrank-1 posts in some other popular matching in G. It is easy to see that the above partition can be readily obtained once we have the set of popular pairs P opP airs (defined by Equation (3)).
Let a 1 be the sole manipulative agent who is aware of the true preference lists of all other agents. Let L = P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P t , . . . , P l denote the true preference list of a 1 where P i denotes the set of i-th rank posts of a 1 . Since we will be working with another instance H obtained by falsifying the preference list of a 1 , we now qualify the sets f (a) and s(a) for every agent with the instance under consideration. For an agent a, let f G (a) and s G (a) denote sets f (a) and s(a) respectively for agent a in G. We note that f G (a 1 ) = P 1 . Assume that s G (a 1 ) ⊆ P t is the set of t-th ranked posts of a 1 , where t > 1.
Recall the strategy -better always defined for a single manipulative agent. If agent a 1 ∈ A f , then she does not have any incentive to manipulate her preference list. Thus, in this case we are done and L is her optimal strategy. We therefore focus on a 1 ∈ A s ∪ A f /s . Let H denote the instance obtained by falsifying the preference list of a 1 alone.
-If a 1 ∈ A s , then in order to get better always her goal is to force at least some popular matching in H to match her to a post which she strictly prefers to her t-th ranked post (that is, s G (a 1 ) ). -If a 1 ∈ A f /s , then in order to get better always her goal is to force every popular matching in H to match her to one of her true rank-1 posts.
Denote by H ≻ G with respect to a 1 if agent a 1 is better always in H. It is instructive to consider examples to get intuition regarding the cheating strategies.
Example 2.
Consider the instance G as shown in Figure 1 
It is easy to verify that every popular matching in H matches a 5 to p 3 which is her true rank-1 post. The idea for an A f /s agent a is to choose a post in s H (a) (here p 8 ) to which a can never be matched in a popular matching in H. We will show that such a post can be chosen whenever there exists a non-sink component in the switching graph and therefore a tight-pair (in this case P 1 = {p 8 , p 1 } and A 1 = {a 2 , a 3 }).
Example 3.
Consider the instance G shown in Figure 1 and let a 1 be the manipulative agent. Every popular matching in G matches a 1 to either p 6 or p 7 and therefore a 1 ∈ A s . Let H denote the instance where a 1 submits the preference list as follows: p 3 is her rank-1 post whereas p 8 is her rank-2 post.
It can be verified that every popular matching in H matches a 1 to p 3 . The intuition here is that, a post to which a 1 wishes to get matched (here p 3 ), should have a path to an unmatched post or roughly belong to a sink component of G M . We also choose a post in s H (a 1 ) (in this case p 8 ) to which a 1 can never get matched in any popular matching in H. However, in this example, this is not the best that a 1 can get by falsifying. Let a 1 falsify her preference list as below and let H denote the falsified instance.
′′ is popular in H and in fact every popular matching in H matches a 1 to p 2 . However, our intuition that p 2 should belong to a sink component does not hold. This is because the edge (a 4 , p 3 ) which got deleted in Step 4 of Algorithm 2.1 is being used after a 1 falsifies her preference list. In order to deal with such cases we will work with a slightly modified instance as defined in Section 4.3.
s(a) for other agents remains unchanged
Let H denote the instance obtained by falsifying the preference list of a 1 alone. Since the rest of the agents are truthful, for every agent a ∈ A \ {a 1 }, we have f H (a) = f G (a). However, since s H (a) depends on the rank-1 posts of the rest of the agents, it may be the case that when a 1 falsifies her preference list, s H (a) = s G (a) for an agent a ∈ A \ {a 1 }. We claim that if a 1 falsifies her preference list only to improve the rank of the post that she gets matched to, the rest of the agents do not change their s(a). Recall that by definition, s H (a) is the set of most preferred posts of a which are even in the graph H 1 (the graph H on rank-1 edges). Theorem 4 states the claim; its proof requires the following lemmas.
and therefore a 1 has no non-rank-1 edges incident on it in the graph G ′ . On the other hand, if a 1 ∈ (U 1 ) G and if a 1 gets matched to a non-rank-1 post in a popular matching M , then M is not a maximum matching on rank-1 edges of G. Therefore in each case, a 1 remains matched along a rank-1 edge in every popular matching in G contradicting the fact that
Proof. Assume for contradiction that there exists an instance H ≻ G w.r.t a 1 and let f H (a 1 ) ∩ (E 1 ) G = {q 1 , . . . , q k }. Note that the rank of each q i in a 1 's preference list is at least t. We show that every popular matching in H matches a 1 to one of q i and hence the rank of the most preferred post that a 1 gets in H is at least t, a contradiction to H ≻ G w.r.t. a 1 .
We first show that if f H (a 1 ) ∩ (E 1 ) G = φ, then the size of the maximum matching on rank-1 edges of H is strictly larger than the size of the maximum matching on rank-1 edges of G. Let G 1 be the graph on rank-1 edges of G and let M 1 be a maximum matching in G 1 that leaves a 1 unmatched. Note that such a matching exists because f G (a 1 ) ⊆ (O 1 ) G which implies that a 1 ∈ (E 1 ) G . Consider the graph H 1 , that is, the graph on rank-1 edges of H. Note that M 1 is a matching in H 1 as no other agent changes her preference list. Since each q i ∈ (E 1 ) G and a 1 ∈ (E 1 ) G , the addition of the edge (a 1 , q i ) creates an augmenting path with respect to M 1 in the graph H 1 . Thus, we get another matching, say M 2 , in H 1 such that |M 2 | = |M 1 + 1|. Now consider a popular matching M ′ in H and let M ′ 1 denote the matching M ′ restricted to rank-1 edges of H. Since M ′ has to be a maximum matching on rank-1 edges of H, it is clear that |M
} let us consider the following cases:
-M ′ (a 1 ) ∈ {q 1 , . . . , q k }: In this case we have the desired contradiction and we are done.
, then the edge (a 1 , q) ∈ G 1 and therefore M ′ 1 is in fact a matching in G 1 . Now since |M ′ 1 | = |M 1 | + 1, it contradicts the fact that M 1 was a maximum matching in G 1 . Therefore assume that, q / ∈ f G (a 1 ). Note that M q) } is in fact a maximum matching of G 1 since no other agents changed their preferences. However, M ′ 2 leaves q unmatched which contradicts the fact that q ∈ (O 1 ∪ U 1 ) G , since every vertex in (O 1 ∪ U 1 ) G remains matched in any maximum matching of G 1 .
, the previous cases have already handled this. In the other case assume that s H (a 1 ) ∩ f H (a 1 ) = φ. This implies that M This finishes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 6. Let M 1 be a maximum matching in G 1 such that M 1 leaves a 1 unmatched. Then, in any instance H such that H ≻ G w.r.t. a 1 , M 1 is a maximum matching in H 1 .
Proof. We first note that such a maximum matching M 1 in G 1 which leaves
is not a maximum matching in H 1 . Then there exists an augmenting path a 1 , p 1 , . . . , a k , p k in H 1 with respect to M 1 where both a 1 and p k are unmatched. However, using the path p k , a k , . . . , p 1 , we have an even length alternating path from p k to p 1 contradicting the fact that p 1 ∈ (O 1 ∪ U 1 ) G . Thus M 1 is a maximum matching in H 1 .
Theorem 4.
Let H be an instance such that H ≻ G w.r.t. a 1 . Then, (i) (E 1 ) G ∩ P = (E 1 ) H ∩ P and therefore s H (a) = s G (a) for every a ∈ A \ {a 1 } and, (ii)
Proof. The proof uses Lemma 4, Lemma 5, and Lemma 6 proved above. The case when f H (a 1 ) = f G (a 1 ) is easy, since H 1 = G 1 and both (i) and (ii) are trivially true. Consider the case when f H (a 1 ) = f G (a 1 ) and let M 1 be a maximum matching in G 1 such that M 1 leaves a 1 unmatched. By Lemma 6, M 1 is also a maximum matching in H 1 . To prove (E 1 ) G ∩ P = (E 1 ) H ∩ P, consider the following two cases:
Assume for contradiction that p ∈ (E 1 ) H ∩ P. This implies that there exists an even length alternating path T with respect to M 1 in H 1 from an unmatched post in H 1 . The path T can not contain a 1 , since a 1 is unmatched in M 1 , thus T is present in G 1 contradicting the fact that p ∈ (O 1 ∪ U 1 ) G ∩ P. -p ∈ (E 1 ) G ∩ P: Let T denote the even length alternating path w.r.t. M 1 in G 1 starting at an unmatched post in M 1 . The path T again can not contain a 1 and hence exists in H 1 thus proving that p ∈ (E 1 ) H ∩ P. Now, since the preference lists of the agents a ∈ A \ {a 1 } remain unchanged, it is clear that s H (a) = s G (a). Finally, consider any a ∈ (O 1 ) G ∩ A. For contradiction, assume that a ∈ (E 1 ) H ∩ A. Then a has an even length alternating path T w.r.t. M 1 in H 1 starting at an unmatched agent. This path has to begin at a 1 , otherwise, it was already present in G 1 . However, the existence of the path T beginning at a 1 implies that there exists a post q ∈ f H (a 1 ) such that q ∈ (E 1 ) G . This contradicts Lemma 5 and thus finishes the proof of the lemma.
An A s agent cannot get one of her true rank-1 posts
In this section we show that if a 1 ∈ A s , then by falsifying her preference list alone, she cannot get matched to one of her true rank-1 posts in any popular matching in H. We prove it using Theorem 5 which requires the following lemmas.
Lemma 7. Let a 1 ∈ A s , and let q ∈ f G (a 1 ). Then, q belongs to a non-sink component of G M and the edge (M (a 1 ), q) is not contained in a cycle in G M .
Proof. We first show that the edge (M (a 1 ), q) is not contained in a cycle in G M . Assume for the sake of contradiction that there exists a cycle C in G M which contains the edge (M (a 1 ), q). Since every cycle in G M has a weight 0, the cycle C is a switching cycle and hence we get another popular matching M ′ = M · C in which a 1 gets matched to q. Since q ∈ f G (a 1 ), this contradicts the fact that a 1 ∈ A s .
We now show that every q ∈ f G (a 1 ) belongs to a non-sink component of G M . Assume not. Then, let there exist some q ∈ f G (a 1 ) such that q belongs to a sink component, say X of G M . In this case we show that there exists a switching path T beginning at M (a 1 ) which uses the edge (M (a 1 ), q). Using T , we construct another popular matching M ′ = M · T where a 1 gets matched to q. Thus, we get the desired contradiction as a 1 ∈ A s .
It remains to prove that the switching path T exists. Observe that the since q belongs to a sink component X , by Property 2 there exists a path T 1 from q to some sink q ′ in X . By Property 1, it is clear that q ′ ∈ E 1 and from Lemma 4, we know that q ∈ O 1 . Using Table 1 of edge weights, it is clear that the path T 1 starting a vertex in O 1 and ending in a vertex in E 1 has weight w(T 1 ) = −1. Finally note that, w(M (a 1 ), q) = +1 since M (a 1 ) ∈ s G (a 1 ) and q ∈ f G (a 1 ). Thus, we obtain the switching path T = M (a 1 ), q, T 1 which ends in the sink q ′ and has w(T ) = 0. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 8. Let a 1 ∈ A s and let q ∈ f G (a 1 ). Let P q be defined as
there is a path from q to q
Proof. Note that since a 1 ∈ A s and q ∈ f G (a 1 ), by Lemma 7, q belongs to a nonsink component, say Lemma 9. Let a 1 ∈ A s and let q ∈ f G (a 1 ). Then, there exists sets A q and P q such that |A q | = |P q | and for every a ∈ A q we have choices H (a) ∈ P q .
Proof. Since a 1 ∈ A s and q ∈ f G (a 1 ), from Lemma 7, we know that q belongs to a non-sink component, say Y, of G M . Therefore, using Lemma 3, we know that there exists a tight-pair A q and P q such that |A q | = |P q | and for each a ∈ A q , we have choices G (a) ⊆ P q . Further, Lemma 4 implies that q ∈ (O 1 ) G . Now consider any post q ′ ∈ P q . From the Table 1 , it is easy to see that q ′ ∈ (O 1 ∪ E 1 ) G , since posts in (U 1 ) G cannot be reached starting at a post in (O 1 ) G . Therefore, we note that every a ∈ A q is such that a ∈ (E 1 ∪ O 1 ) G . This is because in any popular matching, posts in (O 1 ∪ E 1 ) remain matched to agents in (O 1 ∪ E 1 ). To prove the lemma it suffices to show that for every a ∈ A q , choices H (a) ⊆ choices G (a).
By Lemma 8, a 1 / ∈ A q and therefore, we know that {f G (a) ∪ s G (a)} = {f H (a) ∪ s H (a)}, for all a ∈ A q . If no edges had got deleted in Step 4 and
Step 9 of Algorithm 2.1 then we would be done since choices G (a) would have been {f G (a) ∪ s G (a)}. Observe that since every a ∈ A q belongs to a non-sink component of G M , therefore a ∈ (U 2 ) G , thus, by Claim 2 no edge incident on a gets deleted in Step 9 of Algorithm 2.1 when run on G.
It remains to show that if a ′ ∈ A q and edge (a ′ , q ′ ) gets deleted in Using the above lemmas we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Let a 1 ∈ A s . Then by falsifying her preference list alone, she cannot get matched to a post q ∈ f G (a 1 ) in any popular matching in the falsified instance.
Proof. For contradiction assume that there exists a falsified instance H such that in a popular matching M ′ of H, agent a 1 gets matched to q ∈ f G (a 1 ). By Lemma 7, the post q belongs to a non-sink component of G M . Further by Lemma 9, there exists a set of agents A q and a set of posts P q such that |A q | = |P q |, a 1 / ∈ A q and for every a ∈ A q , we have choices H (a) ⊆ P q . Thus, if a 1 gets matched to q in M ′ , then there is at least one agent a ′ ∈ A q which does not have a post to be matched in choices H (a ′ ). This contradicts the fact that M ′ is a popular matching in H.
The modified instanceG
As mentioned earlier, we need to define a modified instance, call itG to develop our cheating strategies. Recall from Example 3 that a rank-1 edge which gets deleted from the graph G ′ in Algorithm 2.1, can be used in a popular matching in a falsified instance. Thus, we defineG from the instance G which has the following properties: (i) every popular matching in G is a popular matching iñ G and, (ii) any edge (a, p) that gets deleted in Step 4 of Algorithm 2.1 when run onG also gets deleted in Step 4 when Algorithm 2.1 is run on H such that H ≻ G w.r.t. a 1 . However, the definition ofG is independent of the agent a 1 .
The graphG is defined as follows: Let G 1 be the graph on rank-1 edges of G and let {q 1 , . . . , q k } be the set of unreachable posts in G 1 . Let us add to the instance G, a dummy agent b whose preference list is of length 1 and has all the unreachable posts in G 1 tied as her rank-1 posts. That is, the preference list of b can be written as (q 1 , . . . , q k ). The set of posts as well as the preference lists of all the agents a ∈ A remain the same as in G. Formally,G = (Ã ∪ P,Ẽ) whereÃ = A ∪ {b} andẼ = E ∪ {(b, q 1 ), . . . , (b, q k )} and each (b, q i ) is a rank-1 edge. By the choice of preference list of b, we note that fG(b) = {q 1 , . . . , q k } and sG(b) = ℓ(b), the unique last-resort post that we add for convenience.
We note that even after the addition of agent b, a maximum matching M 1 in G 1 continues to be maximum matching inG 1 . However, with respect to the partition of vertices on rank-1 edges inG, every vertex is either odd or even iñ G 1 . We show that addition of b leaves the set s(a) unchanged for every agent a ∈ A.
Lemma 10. For every a ∈ A, we have sG(a) = s G (a).
Proof. It suffices to show that (E 1 )G ∩ P = (E 1 ) G ∩ P. Let M 1 be a maximum matching in G 1 . Since M 1 is also a maximum matching inG 1 , partition the vertices ofÃ ∪ P w.r.t. M 1 inG 1 . It is easy to see that the addition of agent b only makes every post that was unreachable in G 1 as odd inG 1 . Thus the set of even posts in G 1 andG 1 is same which completes the proof. Now let M be a popular matching in G, then letM denote the corresponding matching inG such that for every a ∈ A we haveM (a) = M (a) andM (b) = ℓ(b), the unique last-resort post of b. Note thatM is a maximum matching on rank-1 edges inG and for every a ∈ A, we haveM (a) ∈ {fG(a) ∪ sG(a)}.
It is clear thatM satisfied both the properties of Theorem 1 and therefore is a popular matching inG. We can now construct the switching graphGM w.r.t.M inG. Having made these definitions, we can now prove the following lemmas.
Lemma 11. Let (a, p) be an edge which gets deleted in Step 4 of Algorithm 2.1 run onG. Then (a, p) gets deleted in Step 4 when Algorithm 2.1 is run on any instance H such that H ≻ G w.r.t. a 1 .
Proof. As mentioned earlier all vertices inG 1 are either odd or even, hence if an edge (a, p) got deleted in Step 4 of Algorithm 2.1, then it implies that {a, p} ∈ (O 1 )G. To prove the lemma statement, it suffices to show that an agent or a post that was odd inG 1 does not become even in H 1 . Recall that a maximum matching M 1 in G 1 which leaves a 1 unmatched is also a maximum matching iñ G 1 as well as in H 1 . Let a ∈ A be such that a ∈ (O 1 )G. This implies that there exists an odd length alternating path T 1 inG 1 beginning at an unmatched post p. The path T 1 cannot contain a 1 since a 1 is unmatched in M 1 . For contradiction, assume that a ∈ (E 1 ) H . Then there exists an even length alternating path T 2 in H 1 starting at an unmatched agent. This path has to begin at a 1 , otherwise it was already present inG 1 contradicting the fact that a ∈ (O 1 )G. However, if the path begins at a 1 , since a 1 in unmatched in M 1 , we get an augmenting path by joining T 1 and T 2 which contradicts the maximality of M 1 in H 1 . Now consider p ∈ P such that p ∈ (O 1 )G and let T 1 denote the odd length alternating path starting at an unmatched agent. The path T 1 has to begin at a 1 , if not, the same path is present in H 1 and hence we are done. Now assume for the sake of contradiction that p ∈ (E 1 ) H . Let T 2 be the even length alternating path with respect to M 1 in H 1 from an unmatched post p ′ . The path T 2 cannot contain a 1 since a 1 is unmatched and hence joining the two paths T 1 and T 2 we get an augmenting path inG 1 contradicting the maximality of M 1 inG 1 .
Lemma 12. Let a ∈ A \ {a 1 } such thatM (a) belongs to a non-sink component ofGM . Let H be an instance such that H ≻ G w.r.t. a 1 . Then choices H (a) ⊆ choicesG(a).
Proof. Recall that for any a ∈ A \ {a 1 }, fG(a) = f G (a) = f H (a) and sG(a) = s G (a) = s H (a). We also know that, in any instance, for an agent a, choices(a) ⊆ {f (a)∪s(a)}. Thus, if for an agent a ∈ A\{a 1 }, it were the case that choicesG(a) = {fG(a) ∪ sG(a)}, then the lemma statement holds trivially. However due to deletion of edges in Step 4 and Step 9 of Algorithm 2.1 when run onG, it may be the case that choicesG(a) ⊂ {fG(a) ∪ sG(a)}. We note that since M (a) belongs to a non-sink component it implies that both {a, M (a)} ∈ (U 2 )G. Therefore, by Claim 2, no edge incident on a gets deleted in Step 9. Further by Lemma 11, it is clear that if an edge (a, p) gets deleted in Step 4 of Algorithm 2.1 run iñ G, then the same edge gets deleted in Step 4 when run on H. This gives us the desired result that choices H (a) ⊆ choicesG(a) and completes the proof of the lemma.
Single manipulative agent
In this section we develop an efficient characterization of the conditions under which a 1 can falsify her preference list. We formulate the strategy of a 1 depending on whether a 1 ∈ A s or a 1 ∈ A f /s . Throughout, we assume that the true preference list of a 1 is denoted by L = P 1 , . . . , P t , . . . , P l where P i denotes the set of i-th ranked posts of a 1 . Further, f G (a 1 ) = P 1 and s G (a 1 ) ⊆ P t . We will use the modified instanceG to formulate our strategies.
5.1
A s agent Let a 1 ∈ A s and let M be any popular matching in G andM denote the corresponding popular matching inG which matches b to ℓ(b). It follows from the definition of A s that, M (a 1 ) =M (a 1 ) ∈ s G (a 1 ) and therefore M (a 1 ) ∈ P t . We first characterize whether a 1 can get better always using the graphG and the switching graphGM .
Our cheating strategy for a 1 (as shown in Figure 2 ) is simple: it checks if any of a 1 's i-th ranked posts p ∈ P i where i = 2 . . . t − 1, either belongs to a sink component inGM or has a path toM (a 1 ) inGM . If there exists such a post p, our strategy ensures that every popular matching in the falsified instance H matches a 1 to p. We denote by L f the falsified preference list of a 1 . We now state the main theorem in this section. properties. Set post p as a1's rank-1 post in the falsified preference list. 4. To obtain the rank-2 post for a1, let a2 be some agent such thatM (a2) ∈ fG(a1). Let p ′ ∈ sG(a2). Set p ′ as the rank-2 post of a1 in the falsified instance. Proof. We break down the proof into necessity and sufficiency. Necessity: Assume that a post p satisfying one of the two properties of Theorem 6 exists. Let L f = p, p ′ be the falsified preference list for a 1 as returned by Step 5 of Figure 2 . Let H denote the instance where a 1 submits L f and the rest of the agents are truthful. We begin by noting that s H (a 1 ) = p ′ . This is because p ′ ∈ s G (a 2 ) and hence p ′ ∈ (E 1 ) G , therefore p ′ ∈ (E 1 ) H . We show the following hold:
-There exists a popular matching
If p had a path toM (a 1 ), then let T denote a path from p toM (a 1 ) in the graphGM . Else if p belongs to a sink component X ofGM , then let T denote a path from p to a sink in X . We note that the path T does not containM (b) sinceM (b) = ℓ(b) which does not have any incoming edge. In either case, apply the path T to M 1 to get another matching M 2 , that is, p) . Since p is a post ranked 2, . . . , t − 1 in a 1 true preference list, and the rank of posts in s G (a 1 ) is exactly t, it implies that p ∈ (O 1 ∪ U 1 ) G . Therefore we can conclude that that p ∈ (O 1 )G. Further, in either case when the path T ends in a sink vertex or it ends inM (a 1 ), the end point of the path is a post which belongs to (E 1 )G. Thus the path T has weight w(T ) = −1 (refer Table 1 ). We prove that M ′ is popular H. Note that for every a ∈ A \ {a 1 }, we have
′ (a 1 ) = p and note that f H (a 1 ) = {p}. Finally, it remains to show that M ′ is a maximum matching on rank-1 edges of H. To see this, note that, w(T ) = −1, therefore the number of rank-1 edges in M 2 is exactly one less than the number of rank-1 edges inM . However, since a 1 gets matched to her rank-1 post in M ′ , the number of rank-1 edges inM and M ′ are exactly the same, thus proving that M ′ is in fact a maximum matching in H 1 . Thus, M ′ is popular in H. -Every popular matching in H matches a 1 to p : For the purpose of proving this part we will work with the graph G and the switching graph G M corresponding to a popular matching M in G. For contradiction assume that there exists a popular matching M ′′ in H such that M ′′ (a 1 ) = p ′ . Note that the rank-2 post p ′ of a 1 is chosen as follows. Let a 2 be an agent such thatM (a 2 ) ∈ f G (a 1 ). Then p ′ ∈ s G (a 2 ). Recall thatM is a popular matching inG which is obtained from a popular matching M in G. Let M (a 2 ) =M (a 2 ) = q. Note that since q ∈ f G (a 1 ), by Lemma 7, q belongs to a non-sink component in G M . Further, by Lemma 9, there exists a set A q and P q such that |A q | = |P q |, a 1 / ∈ A q and for every a ∈ A q , we have choices H (a) ⊆ A q . We show that the post p ′ also belongs to P q and therefore if M ′′ (a 1 ) matches a 1 to p ′ then there exists at least one agent a ∈ A q who does not have a post to be matched in choices H (a). Thus, M
′′ cannot be a popular matching in H. It remains to prove that p ′ ∈ P q . Note that q = M (a 2 ) ∈ f G (a 2 ) and p ′ ∈ s G (a 2 ). If G M contains the edge (q, p ′ ), then we are done since by definition of P q , it is clear that p ′ ∈ P q . The edge (q, p ′ ) can be absent in G M only if the edge (a 2 , p ′ ) gets deleted in Step 9 of Algorithm 2.1. Note that (a 2 , p ′ ) cannot get deleted in Step 4 since only rank-1 edges get deleted in Step 4. Since q belongs to a non-sink component in G M , it implies that q ∈ (U 2 ) G . Therefore M (q) = a 2 also belongs to (U 2 ) G . Thus by Claim 2, the edge (a 2 , p ′ ) does not get deleted in Step 9 of Algorithm 2.1 and hence p ′ ∈ P q . This completes the proof.
Sufficiency: To prove that our strategy in Figure 2 is optimal, we note that when a 1 was truthful, she got matched to her t-th ranked post in every popular matching in G. Using our strategy either she gets matched to her k-th ranked post in every popular matching in H where k < t or we declare that true preference list is optimal in which case she remains matched to her t-th ranked post where k = t. Then there exists no instance H such that a popular matching in H matches a 1 to a post q ′ which a 1 strictly prefers to her k-th ranked post. For contradiction assume that there exists such an instance H obtained by falsifying the preference list of a 1 alone. Let M ′ be some popular matching of H such that M ′ (a 1 ) = q and a 1 strictly prefers q to her k-th ranked post. Since our strategy in Figure 2 did not find q, the post q belongs to a non-sink component Y inGM and further there exists no path from q toM (a 1 ) inGM . Now consider the two sets P q and A q as defined by Lemma 3. We know that |A q | = |P q |. Further, for every a ∈ A q , we have {choicesG(a)} ⊆ P q . Note that, a 1 / ∈ A q ′ , otherwiseM (a 1 ) ∈ P q ′ which implies that there exists a path from q toM (a 1 ), a contradiction. Further, note that ℓ(b) / ∈ P q and therefore, b / ∈ A q . Thus, for every a ∈ A q we have {choices H (a)} ⊆ P q ′ . Therefore, if M ′ matches a 1 to q ′ , there exists at least one agent a ∈ A q ′ who does not have a post to be matched in choices H (a) and hence M ′ is not a popular matching in H. This finishes the proof of the theorem.
5.2
A f /s agent Let a 1 ∈ A f /s when she submits her true preference list. In order to get better always, the goal of a 1 is to falsify her preference list such that every popular matching in the falsified instance H matches a 1 to posts in P 1 . Let M be a popular matching in G such that M (a 1 ) = p and p ∈ f G (a 1 ). Let M denote the corresponding popular matching inG which matches b to ℓ(b). Consider the switching graphGM . Our strategy for a 1 to get better always (as described in Figure 3) is to search for an even post p ′ in G 1 which belongs to a non-sink component ofGM and further the post p ′ does not have a path T toM (a 1 ) inGM where w(T ) = +1. We prove the correctness and optimality of our strategy using the following theorem.
For every
′ belongs to a non-sink component, say Y1, ofGM and, (b) p ′ does not have a path T toM (a1) inGM such that w(T ) = +1. 2. If no post satisfies both properties, declare true preference list L is optimal for a1. 3. Else set M (a1) = p and p ′ as the rank-1 and rank-2 posts respectively in the falsified preference list of a1. Proof. We break down the proof into necessity and sufficiency. Necessity: Assume that there exists a post p ′ satisfying both the properties of Theorem 7 exists and let H be the instance obtained when a 1 submits L f = p, p
. Therefore, for every a ∈ A, M ′ (a) ∈ {f H (a) ∪ s H (a)}. Finally, since w(T ) = 0 and a 1 and a 2 compensate for the rank-1 edges amongst themselves, it is clear that the number of rank-1 edges in M ′ is the same as number of rank-1 edges inM . Thus, M ′ is a maximum matching on rank-1 edges of H. Thus M ′ is a popular matching in H such that M ′ (a 1 ) = q ′ which gives us the desired contradiction. The case when q ′ has a path toM (a 1 ) is handled below. -q ′ belongs to a non-sink component Y j ofG M : Since q ′ belongs to a non-sink component Y j , it implies that q ′ has a directed path T toM (a 1 ) such that w(T ) = +1. Otherwise our strategy in Figure 3 would have found q ′ . The case when q ′ belongs to a sink component, let T denote the path from Table 1 , it is clear that w(T ) = +1. We obtain M ′ as follows:
. Using the same arguments as above it is possible to show that for every a ∈ A, M ′ (a) ∈ {f H (a) ∪ s H (a)}. We note that since w(T ) = +1 and a 1 no longer remains matched to one of her rank-1 posts, the number of rank-1 edges in M ′ andM is the same. Thus, M ′ is a maximum matching on rank-1 edges in H. Therefore, M ′ is popular in H and M ′ (a 1 ) ∈ s H (a 1 ) which gives us the required contradiction.
Using Theorem 6 and Theorem 7 we conclude the following. Proof. The main steps of our strategy are (i) to compute the set of popular pairs, (ii) to construct the switching graph, (iii) run the algorithm given by Figure 2 or Figure 3 as appropriate for the single manipulative agent. We note that we use the modified graphG for computing our strategies and letñ andm denote the vertices and edges inG respectively. Clearly,ñ = n + 1 andm < m + n = O(m).
Once the switching graph is constructed, we observe that the algorithms in Figure 2 and Figure 3 have checks which can be done in time which is linear in the size of the switching graph. Thus the steps (i) and (ii) defined above decide the complexity of our cheating strategy. In case of ties, we have shown that both the steps can be computed in O( √ nm) time. In case of strict lists, using the switching graph given by McDermid and Irving [13] , both the steps can be computed in O(m + n) time. Thus we have the desired result.
Remark: In each case we constructed a falsified preference list for a 1 which was strict and of length exactly two. However, by appending the rest of the posts in P at the end of a 1 's preference list, there is no change in the popular matchings that the instance H admits. Thus, we conclude that, if an agent can manipulate to get better always she can achieve the same when preference lists are required to be complete.
A characterization of equilibrium
Here we consider the set of agents, their preference lists and the popular matchings algorithm as a complete information game. That is, knowing the true preference lists of all the agents and that the central authority chooses an arbitrary popular matching, every agent chooses a preference list for herself. This preference list is then submitted to the central authority. The goal of every agent is to get better always. An equilibrium of the game is a set of preference lists, one for each agent, such that no single agent can improve her situation by deviating from her equilibrium preference list [14] .
We now show a necessary and sufficient condition for the true preference lists of the agents to be an equilibrium of the above game. Let G = (A ∪ P, E) denote the instance where ranks on the edges represent true preferences of the agents and let M be a popular matching in G. Let A = A f ∪ A s ∪ A f /s denote the partition of agents with respect to the popular pairs in G. LetG = (Ã ∪ P,Ẽ) denote the graph as defined in Section 4.3 and letM denote the corresponding popular matching which matches b to ℓ(b). Note that the agent b is dummy and is not a part of the game. LetGM denote the corresponding switching graph. Let A =Ã f ∪Ã s ∪Ã f /s denote the partition of agents with respect to the popular pairs inG. We first state the following two lemmas.
Lemma 13. If every connected component ofGM is a sink component, then the set of true preference lists of agents a ∈ A is an equilibrium of the game defined by G.
Proof. We claim that since every connected component is a sink component, every a ∈Ã is such that a ∈Ã f ∪Ã f /s . Assume for contradiction that, there exists an agent a ∈Ã s . Then by Lemma 7, we know thatM (a) belongs to a nonsink component ofGM . However, there are no non-sink components, therefore a / ∈Ã s and henceÃ s = φ. We claim that this also implies that A s = φ. Thus every A = A f ∪ A f /s . If a ∈ A f , she does not deviate from her true preference list assuming that the rest of the agents are truthful. On the other hand, if a ∈ A f /s , from Theorem 7, a can get better always if and only if there exists a post belonging to a non-sink component of G M with additional properties. However, there is no non-sink component. Thus, the set of true preference lists is an equilibrium.
It remains to show that ifÃ s = φ then A s = φ. Assume not. Then there exists an a ′ ∈ A such that a ′ ∈ A s . However, a ′ ∈Ã f ∪Ã f /s . Therefore, there exists a popular matching M ′ inG such that M ′ (a ′ ) ∈ fG(a ′ ) = f G (a ′ ). Now It is easy to see that M 2 is a popular matching in G such that M 2 (a ′ ) ∈ f G (a ′ ), a contradiction to the fact that a ′ ∈ A s .
Lemma 14.
If there exists at least two non-sink components inGM , then the set of true preference lists of agents a ∈ A is not an equilibrium of the game defined by G.
Proof. Let Y 1 and Y 2 be two non-sink components inGM . We first claim that any non-sink component there exists an a ∈ A such that a ∈ A f /s . So let a 1 ∈ Y 1 be such that a 1 ∈ A f /s . Further, we claim that any non-sink component contains a post p ∈ P such that p ∈ (E 1 ) G . Let p 2 ∈ Y 2 such that p 2 ∈ (E 1 ) G . Assuming these two claims, it is easy to see that the set of true preference lists is not an equilibrium because a 1 can falsify her preference list by choosing p 2 as her rank-2 post and ensuring that every popular matching in the falsified instance matches a 1 to one of her true rank-1 posts. It remains to show that the the two claims hold. First let us prove that, given a non-sink component inGM , there exists a p ∈ P such that p ∈ (E 1 ) G . Consider a non-sink component Y containing a post in p ∈ P such that p ∈ (O 1 ∪ U 1 )G. Since p belongs to a non-sink component, therefore, p ∈ (U 2 )G and thereforeM (p) = a ∈ (U 2 )G. Therefore the edge (a, q) where q ∈ sG(a) does not get deleted and hence q ∈ Y. However, note that since q ∈ sG(a), therefore q ∈ (E 1 )G ∩ P = (E 1 ) G ∩ P. Thus, the claim holds.
To show that in a non-sink component Y ofGM , there exists an agent a ∈ A f /s , we show that there exists at least one E 1 O 1 edge in Y which belongs to a cycle. This claim can be verified using the Table 1 .
Finally, we are left with the case whenGM contains exactly one non-sink component and zero or more sink components. In this case if there exists an agent a ∈ A f /s such thatM (a) belongs to a sink component ofGM , we conclude that the set of true preferences is not an equilibrium. This is because a can falsify her preference list by choosing her s(a) contained in the non-sink component. In the remaining case, assume that there is no agent a ∈ A f /s such thatM (a) belongs to a sink component ofGM . Then for every a ∈ A s such thatM (a) belongs to the non-sink component inGM , we can verify using our strategy for a single manipulative agent whether true preference list is optimal for a. This can be done in time proportional to the size of the preference list of a. Thus, given the switching graph, it is clear that in linear time we can verify whether the set of true preference lists is an equilibrium strategy for the above defined game. We therefore conclude the following: Theorem 9. There exists an O( √ nm) time algorithm to decide whether true preference lists of the agents are an equilibrium of the game defined above when preference lists contain ties and an O(m + n) time algorithm for the same when preference lists are all strict.
Conclusion
In this paper we presented cheating strategies for a single manipulative agent to get better always. We also studied the equilibrium of a non-cooperative game with all agents. It would be interesting to study how two or more agents cooperate and falsify their preference lists in order to get better always. We leave this as an open problem. Another contribution of the paper is the switching graph characterization of the popular matchings problem with ties. McDermid and Irving [13] have used their characterization in case of strict lists to give efficient algorithms for the optimal popular matchings problem [13] [10]. It would be useful to exploit the characterization developed here and design efficient algorithms for the optimal popular matchings problem with ties allowed. We leave that as another open question.
